

Security on Plastics: Fake or Real?

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

Outline

- Flexible electronics on plastics
- Our implementation
- Our key hiding solution
- Conclusion

Flexible electronics on plastics

Applications

- Commercially used in flexible displays
- Large potential for flexible digital circuits in (passive) RFID/NFC chips, integrated in paper or plastics
- Examples: smart packages, intelligent labels, electronic paper




[source figures: imec]

Flexible electronics on plastics

Technology

- Several thin-film transistor (TFT) technologies exist
- Amorphous metal-oxide TFTs show the best combination of high performance and low processing cost



- Materials:
 - Mo = molybdenum
 - SiO₂ = silicon dioxide
 - SiN = silicon nitride
 - a-IGZO = amorphous indium gallium zinc oxide

Flexible electronics on plastics


Comparison with silicon transistors

	silicon (10 nm)	a-IGZO (5 μm)	
Core supply voltage	0.7 V	5-10 V	➡ 😞 Higher power consumption
Charge carrier mobility	500-1500 cm^2/Vs	2-20 cm^2/Vs	➡ 😞 Lower performance
Transistor density	~ 45 mio per mm^2	10^3 - 10^4 per cm^2	➡ 😞 Larger area
Semiconductor type	n-type and p-type	only n-type	➡ 😞 Unipolar logic
Cost per 1000 transistors	> 0.3 USD	> 0.01 USD	➡ 😊 Lower cost
Flexible?	no	yes	➡ 😊 Bendable, stretchable

Flexible electronics on plastics

Security challenge


- To secure the communication between the flexible tag and the reader, many hurdles need to be overcome
- In this work, we concentrate on two challenges:
 - Integrate crypto cores in the flexible chip
 - The maximum number of TFTs in one chip, reported up to now, is only 3504
 - Prevent the key bits from being read out
 - The chips are not packaged and the features are relatively large
 - There is no electrically readable/writable memory



[source figures: imec]


Our implementation

Design choices




Our implementation

Design choices




pseudo-CMOS logic

- 6 TFTs in one NAND gate
- Pull-Down Network (PDN) repeated
- $V_{bias} > V_{DD} + 2V_T \rightarrow$ rail-to-rail output




Our implementation

Design choices




a-IGZO semiconductor



Our implementation

Layout



- 4044 TFTs
- 331.5 mm²




→ 48 pads for I/O, V_{DD} , V_{bias} and GND

Our implementation


Measurement setup

level shifters

FPGA



chip



probe card


Our implementation

Measurement results

- Fixed 80-bit key: 07C1F07C1F07C1F07C1F07C1F (hex)
- 1000 plaintexts automatically applied
- 1000 correct ciphertexts for:
 - $V_{DD} = 10\text{ V}$ and $V_{bias} = 15\text{ V}$
 - $V_{DD} = 11\text{ V}$ and $V_{bias} = 16.5\text{ V}$
- Maximum clock frequency = 10 kHz
- Number of cycles:
 - 32 (for shifting in the plaintext)
 - 254 (for the actual encryption)
 - 32 (for shifting out the ciphertext)
- Total latency = 31.8 ms


Our implementation

Key programming



Our implementation

Key programming




- power rail (V_{DD})
- ground rail (GND)
- key bits 26-36

} digital logic

Our implementation


Key programming



PROBLEM: The key bits can easily be read out using a microscope

Our key hiding solution


Proposed concept




The temperature change caused by lasering, shifts the threshold voltage (V_T) and thus the $I_d - V_g$ graph



With a fixed input voltage (V_{neg}), the TFT switches from off to on



First option for key programming




Second option for key programming


Our key hiding solution

Experimental validation

TFT microscope images



lasered







not lasered

PROBLEM:

The difference is visible between a TFT that has been lasered and a TFT that has not been lasered

Our key hiding solution

Experimental validation



SOLUTION:

Apply different settings of the laser to cause different V_T shifts that cannot be visually distinguished:

- Setting 1 (top image): attenuation of 45 dB in low energy mode; one pulse applied
- Setting 2 (bottom image): attenuation of 35 dB in low energy mode; two pulses applied

Conclusion

- We presented:
 - The first cryptographic core on flex foil
 - A solution for the “invisible” programming of the key bits
- There are many more security challenges to be tackled
- The technology is rapidly improving and soon ready for mainstream applications
- It is crucial to guarantee the security of these applications